

Model III

Allison: Without McN, Breussen & RFK,
there would have been an air strike;
With an air strike, "I think there would
have been a 30% chance of nuclear war."
"I've never heard an estimate of less than
10% — from anyone who has seriously
studied the problem."

(Hsr: "!"

DE: "!"

note of memo
C-100 II

13
Oct 30

MCN reported he had ordered that no U-2 planes fly until a satisfactory system was developed to safeguard against navigational errors resulting in overflying Soviet territory.

14 10 AM Oct 31

McC: photos of Oct 29 reconnaissance.

R: Castro adamant w/o inspection. Pres conf. postponed.

Pres: recon be flown tomorrow unless progress made in talks.

15 Oct 31, 8 PM

R: unsatisfactory talks between UT and Castro.

tomorrow:

Pres: 1) No U-2 flights

2) Up to 14 low-level sorties, but no plane would make more than one pass over each area. Pres said we were anxious to stop aerial surveillance as soon as OV provides a satisfactory substitute. He added this should be a matter

Draft on Nuclear-free zones (25 Oct? revised 26)

Tungus must be included in ME nuclear-free zone.

might have to withdraw weapons from Tungus
to achieve settlement of Cuban situation.

#37: 10 AM, Oct 27

M&N recommended, Pres approved, 2 daylight recon today:

1 morning and 1 this afternoon [undertaken?] Again
recommended night recon tonight. In response to Pres's
request for delay of this mission, Pres said recon planes should
go on alert, ... final decision this afternoon.

Agreed Russians would be informed of extent of
quarantine zone privately. We could then decide whether to
turn back the two tanker barges, which will ^{be} entering quarantine
zone later today. If they continued, a decision could then be
made as to whether it would be allowed to proceed to

should be
Havana or whether it should be searched, seized, & released,
if as reported, it had on board no prohibited material.
A decision would also be required as to what action should
be taken if the tanker refused to submit to search.

4. At this point in the meeting the printed text of the
last public statement was received. It became clear
that the tone of the public statement varied considerably
from the proposals made by it in his personal letter to
the Pres last night. One approved release of public statement,
which was drafted during the meeting. A second and
longer statement was to be prepared. (This was later
abandoned).

Draft message to it was discussed and a final version
will be completed for Trans. this afternoon.

Decision to drop leaflets deferred.

#8, typed

#10, 11AM Oct 28

1. Field TASS text read
2. McNamara: Kraybill was standing still and as other Cuban ships would be entering quarantine zone today.
3. Pres directed no air action be flown today, no action be taken against Cuban ships today, but every effort made to get US to fly recon missions Monday.
Classified info authorized released to ^{officers} UN on
how amounts to facilitate inspection tests.

Pres approved public statement welcoming his decision to withdraw offensive weapons from Cuba. He agreed that we should read offensive weapons to include bombers, but should not get bogged up on this issue.

[Minutes essentially for action purposes?]

Pres directed letter to be drafted.

13

Oct 30

McN reported he had ordered that no U-2 planes fly until a satisfactory system was developed to safeguard against navigational errors resulting in overflying Soviet territory.

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R: Castro adamant re. inspection. Pres conf. postponed.

Pres: recon be flown tomorrow unless progress made in talks.

15 Oct 31, 8 AM

R: unsatisfactory talks between UT and Castro.

tomorrow:

(Pres: 2) No U-2 flights

b) Up to 14 low-level sorties, but no plane would make more than one pass over each area. Pres said we were anxious to stop aerial surveillance as soon as OV provides a satisfactory substitute. He added this should be a matter

of priority with us because, if a US plane is shot
down, we may have to take retaliatory measures.

What did banks think of ("O": Perry)
risk of brigade etc?
and if it occurred?

But from was not necessary to
JFK's ultimatum (unless, it was
for JFK!) - on the terms he offered.

It could ("should," according
to banks, and most "rational actor
analysts") have come from courage,
or from "calm appraisal of
balance of forces." On as it devel: from a
combination of fear and fear-of-failure, stubbornness, inert, etc.
Kilmer for K, if he was
a "calm rational actor"; but been
huddled, and may (being) have
been necessary.

Leading both
to threat and to
"offer"

i.e. burdened,
giving "normal
moderation"

(JFK allowed "normal moderation"
to outweigh his "offer"
some from & inherent"
on lat. night - therefore war.

What makes K hesitant propping & probation
to downs (it is not, for banks!)

- is
- 1) Thin belief in effective significance: MAAD.
 - 2) His "toughness" till then. ("admirable," normal, predictable Bolshevik!)
 - 3) Thin didn't back down - despite this fact;
he wasn't a coward, why did he?
 - 4) Thin belief in SU control (of SAMs,
AA (?) + minors; so why the machines to deal,
need (he had 48 hours; could if necessary.
have "used" all day Sunday...)
(Why did he seem so soon? in children)
 - 5) Thin knowledge of this down / burdened (degree of) willingness to back
down; being the war

Thin belief should, according to
banks down, not to act. when
offered (wrt SU down).
Thin could not have
backed down - no room -
in K's position (contrary to
bank / not actor opposition
about "normal rat." behaviour!)
on this own!

— Does B think it impossible, certain, that
K would back down? see 235

— Does he think RFK's ult. added nothing
to the prob/risk that US could strike
(by Monday!) if K did not desist in the minutes?
("statement of fact": i.e. (think) did not change situation, US prob.
expression of it may clarify or confirm it for)

(Was airstrike planned for late Monday
(48 hrs) — unlikely — or for first light
Tuesday?

When operational?

Otherwise, he should recognise (not "deny")
that JFK's implicit response to Green was
to increase conditional prob of US strike (= war)
if K did not move within 24⁴⁸ hours
(which JFK did not, much, what!)

RFK did not say: "We can (probably) not
hold back JCS more than 48 hrs, although
we will try ~~to~~ on hardest."

Nor did he believe (what he said) that
there could not be a deal along the lines of
a public trade.

(Wf is ref. to a conf deleted?!

Sat:

27 Oct: No evidence of base activity to date construction;

5 sites open, with by 28 Oct.

Photos of 25 Oct. confirmed presence of FROGS,

tanks, armored vehicles, in a camp.

A U-2 seen later reported overdue,
(where?) then missing & presumed down. Base plane's location

unknown, whether loss had resulted from hostile action.

Subsequent Cuban reports of recovery of wreckage & pilot

body established location, but Castro never explicitly

acknowledged shooting down.

JCS recommended an strike no later than 29 Oct
unless irrefutable evidence of dismantling obtained in
meantime.

Loss of U-2 discussed by JCS with SecDef in light
of action decided on 23 Oct in event of such happening.

(Inform Pres through SAC/DOD demands; ^{probe.} recommend immediate
retal. against the ^{most} likely AM, and ^{probe.} continue U-2).

In view of absence of any facts regarding cause of loss, decided
no action pending receipt of more info.

Castro-U-2

Sovs probably would not use US intervention as
excuse for immediately overrunning Berlin but Sovs
would take advantage of situation, initiate pressures
^{step by step}
& probes, consisting of heavily increased propaganda,
harassment, recognition of East Germany, and closing of
access routes through East German agency.

[Sovs, in effect, 3445 to CMC. like Thompson?]

X

24 Sept to Rittenman

but see

may be

24 Sept. (as of 10 Aug.) Cuban pilots training in IL-28s.

25. Above story questioned ^{in CMC}: how come comment, since no Spanish
word. Initial message this subject had major impact here
and DIA does not want to add to confusion until basic
message ^{fully} clarified.

26 Sept's report based on Spanish account in Russian. Apparent transmission
error omitted a 'no' at beginning of sentence, "Spanish
terminology was noted"

28 Oct 0900-1400 JCS meeting:

In view of recent intell on low equip in Cuba, request recommendation from CINCLANT on any changes necessary in his planning, particularly with the US invasion forces should be equipped with the misses.
CANT replied: considered it prudent that US air & ground forces committed for Cuba have an atomic delivery cap. So JCS authorized him to take nuclear capable delivery systems (e.g. 8" low, Honest John) but no nuc weapons themselves without further JCS approval.

Initially to schedule 4 low-level recon flights for late afternoon, & that aircraft would fly through any fire encountered. (?) (disapproved? no flights)

Drew attention of CINCS to lateral X message, which JCS thought might be an insincere proposal intended to gain time.

Again considered loss of U-2; no action.

Boys probably would not need US intervention and
excuse for immediately intervening Berlin but press
would take advantage of situation, include pressures
^{applied by 15th}
problems, consisting of heavily increased propaganda,
harassment, recognition of East Germany, and closing of
access routes through East German agency.

[Shows, in effect, "YES to GDR. Like Thompson?"]

X

24 Sept. to Rittenman

del. Sen

any be

24 Sept. (as of 10 days) Cuban pilots training in IT-283

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word. Initial message that indicates lead major impact here
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without irrefutable evidence of downing obtained in

operation.

Loss of U-2 recommended by JCS with SecDef in light

of action decided on 23 Oct in event of such happening.

(inform Pres through SAC/DOD channels; ^{panels} recommend immediate

retal. against the ^{most} likely PRV, make probe continue U-2).

In view of absence of any facts regarding cause of loss, decided
no action pending receipt of more info.

Cuba-U-2